"It all happened so slowly" -on controlling function creep in forensic DNA databases.
Forensic DNA databases are implemented worldwide and used increasingly. Part of this increasing usage is arguably a matter of function creep. Function creep refers to changes in, and especially additions to, the use of a technology. In this article we explore the notion of function creep as we discuss why and how it has taken place on forensic DNA databases. We also consider what future function creep it is possible to envisage. (Marx 1988: 387) This is an article about function creep in the use of forensic DNA-databases. Function creep refers to changes in, and especially additions to, the use of a technology. When personal data, collected and used for one purpose and to fulfill one function have migrated to others that extend and intensify surveillance and invasion of privacy beyond what was originally understood and considered socially, ethically and legally acceptable 1 it is known as function creep. The term is frequently used when discussing surveillance technologies or surveillance uses of technologies with other purported primary goals. One of many surveillance technologies that has been subjected to function creep is forensic DNA databases. Since DNA was first used in forensics during the mid 80s, it has been used increasingly, and forensic DNA databases have been and are still being established and developed all over the world.
Not only that, but: -No country has yet ever reduced its established forensic DNA collection or sought to curtail its uses once it has been embedded successfully into its criminal justice system‖ (Williams and Johnson 2005: 16) . While the use of DNA in forensics in the 1 http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/practical_application/surveillance_society_full _report_2006.pdf (last accessed 16.10.08) p 9 beginning was considered quite controversial, there has been a trend that legal restrictions regarding forensic DNA databases have been loosened -function creep has taken place.
One of the main reasons for this function creep is that forensic DNA technology is considered an efficient tool in criminal justice matters, one that contributes to increased security. In this article we will look at: Why and how does function creep occur? Why, when and how might we wish to prevent or stall it? What function creep has taken place on (the Norwegian)
forensic DNA database, and through what processes? What future function creep is it possible to envisage? And, as even technologies implemented to increase security may contribute to insecurity (Aas et al. 2008) ; what safeguards should be in place to render function creep governable? First we will dig deeper into the concept of function creep, then we move on to present the data that the article is drawing from and some methodological reflections, before we present some of the function creep that has taken place in relation to forensic DNA databases and what safeguards we consider beneficial to enable a fairly governed DNA database. The use of the Norwegian forensic DNA database was recently expanded considerably; therefore it will be used as a case for our discussion. However, as Williams and Johnson (2004a: 9) write, the history of the UK National DNA Database (the NDNAD) is a history of continuous expansion. The NDNAD is considered one of the leading, if not the leading, forensic DNA database in the world. Norwegian authorities have pointed to the UK and sought to follow in the UK's footsteps. Thus, even from a Norwegian perspective, we consider it helpful to use examples from the NDNAD in our discussion, not least as an indication of where the Norwegian forensic DNA database might be heading.
Function creep:
What is the concept? Fox (2001: 261) defines function creep as -previously authorised arrangements … now being applied to purposes and targets beyond those envisaged at the time of installation‖. While function creep may be the most common term, several others are used to describe the same, or nearly the same phenomenon. Surveillance creep is one such. Marx (1988) All the terms refer to function change, especially expansion, and especially expansion of surveillance and control functions. All include the word -creep‖. While not all function expansions are -creepy‖ 2 , we do have these terms for function expansion that are negatively loaded, carrying a hint of -sneakiness‖. We see this as in part referring to the social effects of certain functions, in part to the process through which they were implemented, and in part to interactions between effects and implementation process.
The declared function of these technologies -surveillance -can sometimes be regarded as -creepy‖ in itself, a sneaky peering into others' lives the better to control them. But surveillance and social control are also necessary, often positive, aspects of society. The challenge, then, is to define and maintain acceptable forms and levels of surveillance and social control. Sometimes the addition of a new function to a technology is, all things considered, a good thing. How we categorize a function expansion is a value judgment. The next question, then, is how we go about making such judgments.
-Creep‖ can refer to a secretive, sneaky process of change. How democratic or undemocratic the function implementation process has been may also be linked to the outcomes --how we see a given function as affecting distributions of power, autonomy, knowledge, access to resources. But the term may also simply refer to slow, crawl-paced change, which may be a good thing as it allows time for reflection, debate, and democratic process. So not all function expansion warrants a derogatory term, but -creep‖ need not always be derogatory. The term function creep may in a given case refer to the skin-crawling, chilling nature of the latest added function and/or the sneakiness of an undemocratic, secretive process of socio-technical change … but it may also simply refer to slow, considered, and accepted change. In this article we will focus primarily on process and the consequences of process for outcomes. We have chosen to use the term -function creep‖ with its ambivalent implications -potentially both positive and negative -rather than -surveillance creep‖ or -control creep‖ where the power aspects of -surveillance‖ and -control‖ highlight the negative implications of -creep‖.
Function change and expansion occur because they can. They occur because technologies are interpretatively flexible (Bijker 1995) and their users imaginative and creative (Oudshoorn and Pinch 2003) . Surveillance technologies are socio-technical systems for gathering, storing, accessing and analyzing information (so: information systems) about the appearances, communications and actions of human subjects. Information systems are considered to be among the most interpretatively flexible (Bijker 1996) . Information systems are highly flexible because not only can their material tools (computers, routers, servers, screens) be used in multiple ways, but so too can their information content. Regarding DNA, genetic information is already used for medical diagnostics and research, paternity testing, forensic identification, inferring prehistoric migration routes … and further future uses have been predicted. The material structures of the databases can serve to safeguard DNA information or to share it, to aggregate it or to search out individual cases, and so on.
OK, functions creep. What are "functions"?
The term function is used in many contexts with slightly different implications. us by great expanses of time and space. Although the risks can never be eliminated, we must own up to their possibility and make serious attempts to anticipate and control them‖ (Yuthas and Dillard 1999:48) . Garland (1995) argues that surveillance technologies are essential and inevitable in complex societies. In his view, they are not themselves the problem; rather, the issue is how they can be regulated to avoid abuse. While it is almost certainly impossible to foresee, let alone prevent, all future applications of a given new technology, we consider it worthwhile to discuss how such expansion might be governed. The main goal of the article is to discuss:
What safeguards need to be in place to govern forensic DNA databases?
Methods
Function creep evolves over time. Therefore the past, the present and the future are all relevant for discussing it. Looking from the past to the present enables us to see what kind of changes have taken place in the usage of forensic DNA databases. However, wanting to debate how to govern function creep not only at the moment, but also with an eye to the consequences of our decisions, we need to try to raise our gaze from the present to the future.
We agree with Haggerty (2009) In spite of drawing on a wide spectrum of data, this is not a data-driven article. Rather it is driven by our understanding of function creep -why it occurs and how it might be controlled.
We are using our data not to test hypotheses or claims, nor to establish predictive rules, nor to measure the relative strengths of various function creep drivers and controlling instruments.
Rather, we use the data eclectically to illustrate what we think are clear instances and circumstances of function creep and thereby to propose potential means of governing it. More stringent tests of our proposals may be appropriate in future research.
While the Norwegian DNA database is the main case of the article, we use data about the UK NDNAD as a comparison case, since it is used as a reference point -be it as inspiration or object of criticism -not only in Norway but also by stakeholders in many other countries (Williams and Johnson 2008) .
Why function creep takes place and some of the safeguards we need to govern it
Function creep occurs through a number of mechanisms. For instance, we often see technologies introduced when conditions are taken to indicate a dire need, then gradually expanded into less urgent usages. This need not come about conspiratorially. It may also come about in spite of everyone's best intentions, for instance through uncritical optimism and because the moral terrain shifts as soon as the initial investment is made. Once a technology is in place, it becomes wasteful not to use it to the fullest acceptable limit. Usages that might not have been sufficiently legitimate for initial implementation do have sufficient legitimacy to be tacked on later. In other words, there is no need to shout -Wolf! Wolf!‖ We do not need to assume a conspiracy. The best of intentions may lead us in directions and distances we, in retrospect, did not wish to go.
So let us assume good intentions. Obviously, good intentions are insufficient as a means of controlling the spread and direction of function expansion. So what measures can we take to support our good intentions? In the following we will discuss what safeguards -or measuresthat might be helpful to govern forensic DNA databases. For each measure we will also discuss examples showing how, why, when these have been used or might advantageously have been used. None of these measures would of themselves guarantee a -good‖ outcome.
Not only do we need to combine measures because each has its own innate weaknesses, but we also need to accept that in the final analysis we may not all agree on what outcomes are -good‖. While we are aware that no degree of democracy can insure a perfect society, we aspire to look for ways to make the process of technology development, including function expansion, more democratic and less -creepy‖.
Assess necessity and effectiveness
In Norway all work preparatory to official reforms and changes in laws or regulations has to follow specific instructions. The instructions are intended to ensure that financial, administrative and other significant consequences of reforms and measures are clarified. The instructions are also meant to ensure that institutions responsible for the matter assess all relevant and significant consequences, and that stakeholders and the general public are included in the decision-making process before a decision is made (Instructions for Official Studies and Reports 2005). These instructions have been followed in the process of expanding the Norwegian DNA database. But while this is a comfortingly democratic process, it may nevertheless be a flawed one. Democracy needs to be used actively lest complacency allow decisions to pass that we would not have accepted had we thought them through.
One of the main arguments made by Norwegian politicians in promoting expansion of the Norwegian forensic DNA database has been its purported efficiency in solving crimes. In a press release, the Ministry of Justice (2007) 
Laws and regulations
Democracies are based not only in debate, but also in law. Norway's oldest codified lawsthe 13 th century Frostatingsloven -include the sentence, a familiar motto to this day: -Med lov skal landet byggjast, og ikkje med ulov oydast‖ [Through law shall the nation be built, and not by unlawfulness destroyed.]. This faith in the law as a guarantor of justice, fairness, and social stability is characteristic of democratic societies in general, not only of Norway.
We have already seen above that the law requires some degree of reflection and some balance between conflicting interests before taking the first step towards implementing a new technology of such proportions as a national forensic DNA database. That process of consideration may point out some number of concerns and misgivings about the new technology. Frequently we see that such concerns are -met‖ by proposing that implementation of the new technology be contingent on certain legal restraints. Yes, we will have a national DNA database, but the law will limit who will be registered, who will have access to the database, what purposes the database will serve, and so on.
In Norway, as in most other countries, a number of laws and regulations govern the forensic DNA database, for example when it may be used and who may be registered. When the database was first established in 1999 the law only allowed registration of people convicted of severe crimes, such as murder, sexual offences, robbery and grievous bodily harm. A White
Paper (NOU 1993:31) concluded that including people convicted of these crimes would be appropriate and sufficient and that the main goal was -that the detection rate will become as high as possible when it comes to punishable actions, and naturally especially when it comes to severe crimes that threaten other peoples' life and health‖ (NOU 1993:31 p 7, our translation). In 2005, 12 years later, a new White Paper concludes that there is a need to expand the Norwegian DNA database (NOU 2005:19) . This expansion is also linked to an expansion of its goal. Now it is to be used also in the fight against -volume crime‖ 8 . As of September 2008 it is no longer only people convicted of serious crimes who may be registered, but anyone convicted of a crime that may lead to imprisonment 9 . This could include people convicted of speeding, white-collar crime, and draft-dodging. People suspected of crimes, but not convicted, are to be registered on an investigation database that may be searched against the evidence database.
What are the social effects of such a change? -DNA profiling and DNA banking enable the construction of ‗closed circuit' of surveillance of a defined population‖ (Williams and Jonson 2004a: 1) . Once inside the database, you are constantly on a -virtual line-up‖ of potential suspects. The larger the database, the larger the portion of the population subjected to this more or less constant surveillance. The larger the scope of crimes that lead to searches of the database, the more frequently such surveillance takes place. The boundaries of the database and its usage also become a form of social differentiation between a -We, the normal, trusted citizens‖ and a -They, the Others, the non-trustworthy‖. Who falls within this defined population that is subjected to such -bio-surveillance‖ (Williams and Jonson 2004a) has expanded dramatically in less than the nine years that the Norwegian DNA database has been operational. At work is a very familiar process whereby legal restrictions are loosened to be able to use a surveillance technology more (Haggerty and Ericson 2006: 19) and laws and regulations are pushed to obtain desired goals.
In Norway acquitted suspects are to be removed from the investigation-database. The UK had a similar practice until a change allowed indefinite retention of DNA samples. The In general, surveillance technologies have been on the rise in recent years (Innes 2001:3) .
DNA is seen as reliable, trustworthy and secure tool. DNA is expected to increase security on a micro and macro level; the individual's legal protection and society's rule of law (Dahl 2009 legal". And at the same time lab staff claimed to be more or less certain that the police had cheated them at times to make them do illegal analyses, but covered in a way so that they could not really see or say they were illegal.
Regulatory gaps imply that rules and regulations may not be enough to be able to control function creep. Writing laws is a slow Parliamentary process, revising them equally slow and too rarely addressed. Sunset provisions mandate that a law will expire on a particular date, unless it is reauthorized by legislature 13 . It may be applied to an entire legislation or parts of it 14 . This is a way to make sure that legislation is reviewed and kept up to date. It is also a way of ensuring that usage does not expand uncontrolled. Even so, this is a process that happens with years in-between, and not on a day-to day basis. How then might we manage to deal with issues and conflicts arising on a day-to-day basis? We will discuss several possible channels for this below. In Norway, as of now, there is no ethics committee with the remit to oversee the usage of the forensic DNA database. It is probably just a matter of time before research requests and requests for new forensic applications, such as those made in the UK, will turn up in Norway as well. As the laws on the matter are unclear and there is no ethics committee, the Norwegian DNA database remains vulnerable to such requests.
Ethics committee

Control committee?
While an ethics committee would consider the ethical issues of a DNA-database with the intention of evaluating a need before it takes place, a control committee would be mandated to oversee that rules and regulations are upheld. While in Norway there is no control committee as such, in the UK there is the Custodian. The Custodian is entrusted with maintaining and safeguarding the integrity of the NDNAD and developing policy (Nuffield 2007: 93 This policeman, who doesn't see the possibility of the DNA database going too far, claims that there should be a control committee to keep an eye so that the police do not misuse the DNA database. At the same time, it also shows that the existence of a control committee is felt to release the policeman from the responsibility to police himself.
Sanctions
One major problem with many laws and regulatory bodies is that they are ineffective in large part because they lack sanctions. For instance, in Norway there are many rules governing the collection of forensic evidence, yet even illegally collected evidence may be permitted in court. This openness for unlawfully collected evidence also encompasses unlawful uses of DNA database information. Strandbakken, the leader of the Norwegian White Paper committee on expansion of the DNA database, writes: -Even if a DNA-stain is collected contradictory to the Criminal Procedure Act, a Norwegian court will probably not exclude the evidence‖ (Strandbakken 2007 : 352, our translation).
There have been a number of examples where Norwegian police have used, if not illegal, then at least untraditional methods to obtain a DNA profile and search it against the DNA database. In one instance, a man the police suspected of a serious crime happened to drown, his body thereby arriving at the Institute of Forensic Medicine for an autopsy. This was very convenient for the police who, without asking consent of the next of kin, took a sample for comparison. This sample exonerated the man, but implicated his brother through familial similarities. Another suspect in the same case died of cancer. Here the police requested access to tissue samples at the hospital but were turned down. The case went all the way to the Supreme Court, which ruled against the police request. This Supreme Court ruling casts the use of the drowning victim's DNA in a critical light, but did not prevent the use of the evidence in court. Other creative collection methods have also been used. In one case police picked up cigarette butts from a person's garden. In another a suspect was called in for questioning on an unrelated case, one in which he was not a suspect but a witness. In this relaxed atmosphere he was served a glass of water which then was used to obtain his DNA profile for use in the case in which he was a suspect (Strandbakken 2007) . Such creative, and some would say illegal, ways of working have however no formal consequences for the police.
It is important that sanctions are clear and effective. Additionally, it should also be possible to apply these sanctions to both individuals and organizations that are caught misusing data.
PETs
Even the most effective sanctions, however, primarily come into play after a breach has taken place. Before that, they have only a presumed or hoped-for cautionary effect. Another way to back up intentions with enforcement is to inscribe (Akrich 1992 ) the enforcement directly into the technology. In the case of DNA databases, privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) might be built into the database software. 
Transparency
So far we have discussed measures that imply the state watching and controlling itself.
However, it is a democratic state's duty to provide transparency so as to enable the possibility of sousveillance (Mann 2002) . Sousveillance describes situations where the public watches and thereby controls the state by opening up for the possibility to comment and/or object to observed practices. Of course, when it comes to forensic technologies, transparency runs up against the perceived necessity that police methods be kept secret so as to prevent, or at least The Prüm Treaty is the first international treaty which arranges an automated cross-border matching of biometric data. (Töpfer 2008: 14 ) . people may withdraw their samples if they disagree with what is taking place. This is due to the fact that samples are -given‖ by medical ‖donors‖ but -taken‖ from -suspects‖. These differences influence how consent, privacy, and autonomy, are presented in the two contexts (Johnson and Williams 2004b: 211) . Nevertheless, even though -participation‖ is nonvoluntary -or perhaps all the more so when participation is non-voluntary -issues of trust and transparency become important in relationship to forensic DNA databases: -It is often asserted that the maintenance of public confidence, or trust, in the operation of forensic as well as medical databases is partly dependent on the openness and transparency of their operation‖ (Williams and Johnson 2008: 139) . Because the power balance between the registered and the owner of the DNA database is not equal, there is a need for the possibility of public debate about the uses of forensic DNA databases. This requires transparency.
Proposed new functions should be widely publicized and accepted by the public before being irredeemably entrenched. today, but also that of tomorrow (since we do not know what will be doable with the genetic material in the future). The possibility of data-sharing across borders requires further that we trust other governments over whom we hold no democratic sway.
We also see how Horne evades the actual question. She is in no position, nor would representatives for any other party be in a position, to make a definitive promise. No party can guarantee that they will never accept function creep. This may be one of the reasons why the Norwegian Parliament went against what was recommended to them by the DNA-committee, and voted against retention of samples. Short of not collecting DNA in the first place, the most effective way of limiting research on DNA gathered for forensic uses is to destroy samples and only retain profiles. This is also a more permanent way to protect privacy (Steinhardt 2004: 190) . Limiting the scope of the database in this way implements -brakes‖ and safeguards, allowing more time to reflect what direction it is desirable to move in the future. Research will still be possible, just more expensive and laborious as new samples may have to be gathered.
Returning to our earlier point about interpretative flexibility being a basic premise for function creep: Information is almost limitlessly interpretatively flexible; databases almost limitlessly searchable and analyzable. Thus, the best way to limit the function creep of information databases is to limit the information they contain.
Is there a moral to this story?
Function creep seems nearly always to take place on surveillance technologies, and as we have shown in this article forensic DNA databases are no exception. When additional functions are added to a technology slowly, people will often be less skeptical of the development than they might have been had those functions been proposed early on. We can already see that our resolve against expanding uses for DNA-technology has been weakened.
When it is used for one purpose, then another, why should a third matter? -As Marx warns:
-Once DNA analysis comes to be seen as a familiar and benign crime control tactic, the way will be paved for more controversial uses‖ (Marx 1998) .
While forensic DNA databases and function creep on them may contribute to increased security, they may also contribute to increased insecurity. Often it comes down to a value judgment whether a given function expansion is considered positive or negative. In this article, drawing on data from a larger project, we have shown some examples of function creep. Looking to the past, present and future we have presented some safeguards that we believe should be in place to enable the governing of forensic DNA database functions and practices. Clearly none of these safeguards are sufficient on their own; they need to work together.
In the UK safeguards in relation to the NDNAD have been developed over the last 13 years, and are still being developed. Norway's DNA database has a slightly shorter history and is far less extensive than the English and Welsh NDNAD, but this is not due to safeguards already in place. Instead we see that the safeguards too seem to have developed at a slower pace than in the UK. Without effective safeguards in place, we can look to UK practices and see our future virtually inscribed … some of it promising, and some of it alarming. Using what safeguards we do have available, it is now up to us to mobilize the forces of democratic debate.
Not only do we need debate; we need that debate to achieve some level of sophistication.
- [W] hile the technology is still undergoing development, the sophistication of ethical and normative debates have not advanced at a similar pace, leaving issues of human rights and civil liberties still to be properly accounted for‖ (McCartney 2006: 193) . In current debate we see that the rhetoric supporting crime prevention initiatives, including function creep on existing systems, is often expressed in binary opposites: safety vs. privacy, or security vs. rule of law, or suspects' rights vs. victims' rights (Dahl and Lomell forthcoming) . In this article we have seen how arguments such as crime prevention, security and safety have trumped ethics and human rights issues such as privacy, rule of law and freedom.
Expansion of DNA databases challenges human rights such as the presumption of innocence, because the very structure of standard database usage procedures implies that earlier criminals are considered probable suspects of future crimes and must -prove‖ their innocence by not matching crime scene samples. Specific DNA database usages entail further ethical challenges. Familial searching, for instance, may confront citizens, with previously unknown family ties. The use of ethnic inference borders on the ethically dubious practice of racial targeting.
McCartney seems pessimistic as to the ability of human societies to rise to these challenges.
-The protection of the public in risk-averse society will always trump individual rights‖ (McCartney 2006: 196) . Always? Perhaps. Perhaps social discourse will always fail to recognize dangers to human rights, will always slip into a comfortably distanced vision in which those dangers only affect the -Others‖ (i.e. criminals) and never ourselves. So perhaps we are being naïve in writing this article, yet it remains our hope that it may help spark a more reflective and balanced debate.
